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First Amendment Limits on Library Collection Management*
Anne Klinefelter**
First Amendment freedoms impose some limits on publicly funded libraries’ discretion to manage their collections, but identifying those limits is difficult. The First
Amendment law of libraries is murky territory, defined by three Supreme Court
decisions that failed to produce majority opinions and lower court opinions that have
employed a variety of doctrinal approaches. Libraries nonetheless must make sense
of these cases to create and implement collection development and Internet access
policies and procedures. This article surveys and analyzes the First Amendment law
of library collections and finds that libraries’ discretion is broad, but certain limitations apply. These can serve as a reminder to librarians of their ethical commitment
to challenge censorship and provide access to all points of view.
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Introduction
¶1 May a state law library adopt a policy to collect books written by Democrats

but not Republicans? May a county law library decline to add to its collection
donations of books arguing against voting rights for women? May a law school
library refuse to disable Internet filters that block sites on breast cancer? May a law
school library remove books because students complain that the books are racist?
¶2 The short answers are: almost certainly not, probably, maybe not, and probably not. The general answer is that law libraries, including publicly funded law
libraries, have broad discretion to manage their collections, including controlling
Internet access. If decisions are reasonable in light of the library’s mission and not
an attempt to prevent access to an idea, libraries should be safely within the boundaries of the First Amendment.
¶3 Truth be told, law librarians do not much discuss the implications of the
First Amendment in law libraries. One reason for this omission is that few conflicts
in law libraries lead to litigation. Librarians in private law libraries are not subject
to First Amendment restrictions, and publicly funded law libraries rarely confront
patron challenges or legislative restraints beyond requirements that collections be
related to the law. Another reason that law librarians do not much discuss library
First Amendment cases could be because these cases form a messy, largely incoherent body of law, including three Supreme Court decisions that failed to produce
majority opinions. This case law is confusing and difficult for librarians to use as
guidance in collection management.
¶4 But those of us in publicly funded law libraries could take some tips from
our colleagues in public and school libraries, where First Amendment challenges
are more common. Law libraries may have similar problems managing access to
illegal and controversial materials on the Internet. Academic law libraries in particular could be targets for conservative or liberal groups who might demand addition or removal of materials from library collections.1 And all law libraries are
1. The organization called Students for Academic Freedom has promoted a greater representation of conservative viewpoints in higher education and might target campus libraries. See
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subject to potential questions from a supervising authority about the inclusion or
exclusion of particular viewpoints in the library’s collection. Law librarians should
understand the application of the First Amendment to help them make collection
decisions and respond appropriately to the recommendations of library users and
institutional supervisors.
¶5 This article explains why library cases are so difficult for courts and identifies
the fuzzy boundaries of libraries’ discretion in collection management that emerge
from library cases. First Amendment boundaries of libraries’ discretion are fairly
remote and unlikely to interfere with most law libraries’ collection decisions. But
they probably prevent all publicly funded libraries from removing and perhaps
excluding materials as an attempt solely to suppress access to the view expressed.
And these First Amendment restrictions suggest that publicly funded law libraries
should follow adequate procedures before enforcing policies that could interfere
with library patrons’ access to library resources.
¶6 A number of legal scholars and libraries themselves have argued that a solution to the messy and confusing First Amendment law of libraries is to give libraries
absolute or nearly absolute discretion to manage their collections.2 Law librarians
Barbara Bintliff and Dick Danner have suggested that academic librarians’ collection management could be protected from both institutional and external influence
through academic freedom principles.3 This article adds to the discussion by surveying Supreme Court and relevant lower court opinions to identify the existing
boundaries of libraries’ discretion under the First Amendment. This examination
of library First Amendment cases has four goals: (1) to explain why library First
Amendment law is complex and confusing; (2) to provide a current survey of
Supreme Court and lower court cases; (3) to show that the First Amendment limits
library collection development in situations that are, fortunately, unusual for law
libraries; and finally, (4) to suggest how law libraries can protect themselves from
potential challenges and use their broad discretion in support of institutional, ethical, and First Amendment goals.
The First Amendment and Library Collection
Management—A Surprising Mismatch
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
Students for Academic Freedom, Academic Bill of Rights, http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom
.org/documents/1925/abor.html (last visited May 3, 2010). The American Library Association passed
a resolution denouncing this organization’s efforts as counter to academic freedom. Am. Library
Ass’n, Resolution in Support of Academic Freedom (adopted Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.ala.org/ala/
aboutala/offices/oif/statementspols/ifresolutions/academicfreedom.cfm. Liberal trends to restrict hate
speech have secured campus policies for public discourse at a number of universities that could target
university and academic law libraries. Robert V. Labaree, The Regulation of Hate Speech on College
Campuses and the Library Bill of Rights, 19 J. Acad. Librarianship 372 (1994).
2. See infra ¶¶ 20–22.
3. Barbara Bintliff & Richard A. Danner, Academic Freedom Issues for Academic Librarians,
Legal Reference Services Q., 2006, No. 4, at 13, 20. For more on the academic freedom aspect of the
First Amendment question, see infra ¶ 22.
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right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.4

Features of First Amendment Law Relating to Libraries
¶7 Library

First Amendment law is a function both of constitutional doctrine
and of the practice of library management. The following summaries of the special
characteristics of the law and of library collection management show how the
intersection between the two has aspects of a collision of interests rather than an
artful intertwining of similar missions. These sections explain why the First
Amendment law of libraries is so messy and provide context for the case analysis
that follows.
Conflict Between Collection Selectivity and Neutral Treatment of Speech
¶8 Law librarians in publicly funded libraries may think of their collection
management and other services as supporting First Amendment freedoms of
speech and the press because these libraries increase access to information, largely
without direct cost to the library user. Indeed, library associations promote ethical
principles that encourage broad access to a diversity of ideas. The American
Association of Law Libraries (AALL) endorses the Library Bill of Rights of the
American Library Association, which asserts that libraries should “challenge censorship” and present “all points of view” in library collections.5 This policy states
that “library resources should be provided for the interest, information, and
enlightenment of all people of the community . . . .”6 The AALL Ethical Principles
lead with the declaration that law libraries make it possible for individuals to participate fully in the democratic process.7 These statements show that librarians,
including law librarians, have as their professional goals many of the commonly
attributed goals of the First Amendment—truth that emerges from the “marketplace of ideas,”8 individual expression and development,9 and democracy.10
¶9 But libraries’ selectivity in collection management runs afoul of the standard
tests for compliance with the First Amendment. Courts generally require government actors to treat speech in neutral ways to avoid abridging freedom of speech
and of the press. One way courts measure First Amendment neutrality is through
4. U.S. Const. amend. I.
5. Am. Library Ass’n Council, Library Bill of Rights (1996), available at http://www.ala
.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oif/statementspols/statementsif/librarybillofrights.pdf; Am. Ass’n of Law
Libraries, Government Relations Policy § V (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.aallnet.org/about/
policy_government.asp.
6. Am. Library Ass’n Council, supra note 5.
7. See Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, Ethical Principles (Apr. 5, 1999), available at http://www
.aallnet.org/about/policy_ethics.asp.
8. William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30
Ga. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1995). See also Citizens United v. FCC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (2010); John Stuart Mill,
On Liberty 15–52 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859).
9. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995); C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1978); Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 263.
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skeptical review of government decisions that make distinctions based on the content of private speech.11 But publicly funded libraries regularly select material for
their collections based on the content of those materials. For example, a county law
library in California might buy a guide to the law of oceanfront development, while
a county law library in Iowa might not.
¶10 Courts are even more skeptical when government makes decisions based on
the viewpoint expressed in private speech.12 Public libraries arguably make these
types of distinctions as well when they select materials based on quality and on the
likely level of interest to the communities they serve. For example, a state supreme
court law library might not add donations of books arguing against voting rights
for women if the library found the views expressed were not related to the library’s
mission to manage limited resources through access to current primary law and
practice guides.
¶11 As a philosophical matter, publicly funded libraries’ selective support for
speech and the press actually distorts the marketplace of ideas, providing greater
access for some ideas over others. Selective support for information might also fail
to support some individuals’ reading interests and frustrate the First Amendment
goal of individual expression and development. Further, if libraries’ selection
choices are seen as representing the government’s view of what is the best information, libraries compromise two other goals commonly attributed to the First
Amendment—citizen oversight of government13 and the prevention of government’s ability to make speech distinctions.14 One might well argue that selectivity
in law library collections, particularly if it applied to providing access to the law,
would frustrate the First Amendment goal of democracy.
¶12 Selectivity in library collections, though, is unavoidable given the scarcity of
resources for collections, staffing, facilities, and technology. Some would say that
selectivity is not only a function of necessity due to scarce resources but also a function of design. Law libraries especially have a purpose or mission that requires them
to make selections based on the content of materials. A number of public library
librarians, however, promote a shift from the public community library’s traditional purpose as moral and intellectual arbiter to a more neutral information
manager.15 These advocates sometimes seek court support for their efforts to provide access to controversial materials through enforcement of the First Amendment.16
11. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to
content-based regulations).
12. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806, 812–13 (1985)
(remanding for determination of whether suppression of viewpoint was motivation for regulations).
13. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 A.B.A. Found. Res. J. 521.
14. See Ruth Walden, A Government Action Approach to First Amendment Analysis, 69 Journalism
Q. 65 (1992).
15. See, e.g., James LaRue, The New Inquisition: Understanding and Managing Intellectual
Freedom Challenges (2007); Office for Intellectual Freedom of the Am. Library Ass’n,
Intellectual Freedom Manual (7th ed. 2006); Louise S. Robbins, Censorship and the American
Library: The American Library Association’s Response to Threats to Intellectual Freedom,
1939–1969 (1996).
16. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion); John
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As advances in information technology have diminished the impact of scarcity of
library resources, some argue that courts should apply stricter standards for public
libraries’ First Amendment compliance.17 But, whether based on scarcity alone or
on both scarcity and design, selectivity continues to be a defining characteristic of
all publicly funded libraries, including law libraries. Given this selectivity, and given
the general societal consensus that libraries are an overall benefit, courts are wary
of applying standard First Amendment analysis in library cases for fear that the
entire library system could be found in violation of the First Amendment.18
Other First Amendment Rights in Library Cases
¶13 In addition to collection management, a variety of

other First Amendment
rights can be at issue in library cases, and all of these may affect the law of library
collections. Libraries have been challenged on free exercise and on establishment of
religion grounds as well as infringement of association rights for restrictive policies
on access to meeting rooms.19 Libraries have been defendants in freedom of speech
and press challenges to the removal20 or relocation21 of books, the filtering of the
Internet,22 and actions or policies that regulate users’ behavior and thereby access
to the library and the library’s collection.23 Some restrictions on user behavior have
been found to violate the right of assembly and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.24 Libraries have challenged legislation on behalf of
the library user’s right to receive information through the rights of freedom of
speech and of the press.25 As libraries increase Internet services, patrons may challenge any policies or software filters that restrict library Internet use as interference
N. Gathegi, The Public Library as a Public Forum: The (De)Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 75 Libr. Q. 1
(2005).
17. The mission of the public library relating to Internet access was at the core of the controversy
in the ALA cases. For an examination of how the Supreme Court has struggled with understanding
the role of libraries in society, see Raizel Liebler, Institutions of Learning or Havens for Illegal Activities:
How the Supreme Court Views Libraries, 25 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
18. Justice Breyer wrote, “To apply ‘strict scrutiny’ to the ‘selection’ of a library’s collection . . .
would unreasonably interfere with the discretion necessary to create, maintain, or select a library’s
‘collection’ . . . .” ALA II, 539 U.S. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
19. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, No. C 04-03111 JSW, 2009 WL 1765974
(N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009) (upholding library meeting room policy prohibiting use for pure religious
worship as not viewpoint discrimination, but a category of content restriction consistent with purposes of the library as limited public forum); Ethnic Employees of Library of Congress v. Boorstin,
Nos. 80-2163, 82-2264, 1987 WL 4804 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1987) (considering association rights of
employees under policy of access to meeting rooms for employee organizations), aff ’d, 865 F.2d 1329
(Table) (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 1989).
20. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico (Pico III), 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
21. Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
22. ALA II, 539 U.S. 194; Miller v. Nw. Region Library Bd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 563 (M.D.N.C. 2004);
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Loudoun I), 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998); Crosby v. S. Orange
County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4th 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
23. See, e.g., Neinast v. Bd. of Trs., 346 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2003); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958
F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
24. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (prevailing three-Justice opinion holding that punishing civil rights activists for a silent sit-in at a public library violated their First Amendment rights).
25. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States (ALA I), 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 450–51 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev’d,
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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with a right to quiet expression on blogs and wikis or a right to petition the government through e-mail to officials.26
Different First Amendment Law for Different Types of Libraries
¶14 A reasonable question is why the First Amendment, which begins “Congress
shall make no law,” should apply to publicly funded libraries at all, particularly law
libraries. Although the language of the First Amendment restricts only Congress’s
power to make laws that interfere with certain rights, courts have extended the
amendment’s application to actions of all branches of government and, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, to the states and their subsidiaries.27 With few exceptions,
libraries that are largely publicly funded and open to the public are recognized by
courts as government actors who must act within the boundaries of the First
Amendment.28 Some libraries at private institutions could possibly qualify as government actors if the court found that government is responsible for the challenged
behavior, but this finding is rare and is unlikely to apply to law firm libraries, corporate law libraries, or other private libraries.29
¶15 In modern analysis, courts further divide government actors into types of
forums to determine their level of obligation under the First Amendment.
Government actors are categorized as traditional public forums, designated or limited public forums, and nonpublic forums. Traditional public forums, idealized as
a public park, are those where First Amendment freedoms are most protected.30
Designated or limited public forums must protect First Amendment freedoms

26. This concern was central to the district court’s holding in the American Library Ass’n case. See
id. at 469–70.
27. The Fourteenth Amendment includes the provision that “No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. This restriction
applies only to state actors. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a
commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment
by government, federal or state.” (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973))); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (“It is also well settled that municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action and are within the prohibition of
the amendment.”).
28. The lower court in American Library Ass’n explained: “Because we find that the plaintiff public libraries are funded and controlled by state and local governments, they are state actors, subject to
the constraints of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 450 n.20.
29. The New York Public Library was found not to be a state actor for civil rights claims because
it is only partially supported with public funds and because by the terms of its contract with the state
and by practice it maintains control over the library independent of the city or state. See Gilliard v.
N.Y. Pub. Library Sys., 597 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The standard of “under color of state law” is
used when plaintiffs file civil suits claiming violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this
standard is similar to that for a state actor. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382 (3d
Cir. 1976).
30. Courts recognize as traditional public forums only those settings which have for “time out
of mind, . . . been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions,” and libraries have not met this standard. ALA II, 539 U.S. at 205 (quoting
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)).
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according to their commitments to do so,31 and nonpublic forums must meet relatively minimal requirements under the First Amendment.32 Library cases are all
over the map in terms of forum analysis. Some library cases predate or ignore
modern forum analysis; some have found public libraries to be designated public
forums for the limited purpose of the right to receive information; and others,
most notably United States v. American Library Ass’n, suggest forum analysis is
inapplicable to public libraries’ decisions about which private speech to make available to the public, indicating that the library is either a nonpublic forum or simply
not a forum at all.33
¶16 Because law libraries have not been the subject of First Amendment litigation, law librarians must turn to cases about other publicly funded libraries for
guidance about First Amendment law. Community public libraries and school
libraries are the subjects of most challenges, but the law of these libraries may not
map directly onto law libraries. Generally, courts will measure the library’s compliance with the First Amendment by the conformity of the collection decisions to the
library’s mission, so differences in mission produce differences in legal obligations.
Viewed along a continuum of obligations under the First Amendment, courts may
require the most neutrality from public libraries with missions to serve entire communities, slightly less neutrality from law libraries with missions to serve particular
patron groups’ legal research needs, and even less neutrality from public school
libraries whose mission is even narrower because of its link to the inculcative and
curricular roles of schools.34
The Right to Receive Information
¶17 The right most often raised in library First Amendment cases is the right to
receive information as a function of freedom of speech and of the press. One of the
principled problems of library First Amendment law relates to this right to receive
information through the library.35 Courts are reluctant to characterize the First
Amendment as a positive right that requires the government to affirmatively do
something, such as purchase a particular book or even keep it on the shelves. The
“abridgment” language of the Amendment could mean that the right is only a
negative right to prevent government regulation that diminishes or interferes with

31. To create a designated public forum, “the government must make an affirmative choice to
open up its property for use as a public forum.” Id. at 206. To create a limited public forum the government may designate a government property or program as a public forum “for certain groups or
for the discussion of certain topics.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001)
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995)).
32. Generally, courts have found that government properties or programs that are not traditional or designated public forums are by default nonpublic forums, but a relatively new fourth
category of “not [a] for[um] at all” may also exist. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 677 (1998).
33. See ALA II, 539 U.S. at 204.
34. In dissenting in Pico, Justice Rehnquist wrote, “Unlike university or public libraries, elementary and secondary school libraries are not designed for freewheeling inquiry . . . .” Bd. of Educ. v. Pico
(Pico III), 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 Law Libr. J. 175, 2003 Law Libr.
J. 11.
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any of the protected activities. Under this view of the First Amendment, a library’s
removal of a book from the collection would leave a patron no worse off than if the
library were never created or the book was never added to the library’s collection.
In contrast, a law that prohibited the community from reading that book would
violate the negative right that prevents government from abridging the right to
receive information. The distinction is one between government subsidies and government regulations. This view of the First Amendment as a negative right could
mean that the First Amendment simply does not apply to government subsidies like
public libraries. No matter what a library does—acquire, remove, or filter—the bottom line is that libraries can only make affirmative or positive contributions to the
reading options of their communities, so they could not violate a negative right to
receive information.
¶18 But modern courts have rejected this absolutist view of the First Amendment
as a negative right inapplicable to subsidies like libraries.36 Courts have characterized some library actions as abridgments37 and at times have embraced the concept
of a positive right of access to information through public libraries.38 Once libraries
make information available, courts have found that removal of that material must
meet First Amendment doctrinal tests because that removal could constitute
abridgment and violate negative First Amendment rights.39 Some courts have
found that libraries reflect a commitment to support the right to receive information, which in turn requires the library to protect access under the more stringent
requirements for limited public forums.40 Nonetheless, the library cases reveal significant judicial discomfort with the positive right implications of a First
Amendment right to receive information.41
Evidence and Judicial Workload Concerns Limit
Judicial Review to Removal of Books
¶19 In some cases, courts have determined that the proper way to apply the First

Amendment to libraries is to prohibit decisions based on intent to suppress access
to particular ideas.42 This approach requires judges to determine the intent of the
librarian in acquiring, rejecting, or removing a book. However, traditional book
selection presents evidentiary and workload challenges courts do not welcome.43
36. On the topic of government subsidies and free expression, see generally Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293
(1984); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 Minn. L.
Rev. 543 (1996).
37. See Pico III, 457 U.S. 853 (plurality opinion).
38. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
39. See Pico III, 457 U.S. 853 (plurality opinion); ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d
1177 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 659 (2009).
40. Kreimer, 958 F.2d 1242; Neinast v. Bd. of Trs., 346 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2003).
41. See Pico III, 457 U.S. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that recognition of a right to
receive information was an improper creation of an affirmative right and would make a public library
a “slavish courier of the material of third parties”).
42. Id. (plurality opinion); ACLU v. Miami-Dade, 557 F.3d 1177.
43. The same approach could apply to review of decisions about other tangible materials
in a library’s collection, although the decision to add or remove a subscription to a journal or a
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Traditionally, librarians review and select new materials on a title-by-title basis, and
the process can involve complex comparative assessments of potential purchases
and local needs. The process does not usually produce evidence that would reveal
intent to suppress a particular idea or viewpoint. These evidentiary and workload
challenges have led courts to reject standard First Amendment review of library’s
acquisition decisions.44 Book relocation or removal decisions, in contrast, are fewer
in number and more often produce a trail of evidence that can be reviewed for
discriminatory intent. Courts have noted that the lowered evidentiary and workload barriers make removal and relocation cases more appropriate for First
Amendment judicial review.45
Proposals for Constitutional Protection of Libraries’ Discretion
¶20 Several scholarly proposals would give libraries constitutional protection
based on the libraries’ right to free speech, not just First Amendment accommodation for their discretion to manage their collections.46 Libraries themselves have
made this argument—in American Library Ass’n the libraries argued that Congress
should not be permitted to condition federal subsidies on libraries’ installation of
Internet filters because those conditions would violate a library’s First Amendment
free speech right to manage its collection without interference.47 In another case, a
library argued that library patrons should not be able to interfere with the library’s
right to install Internet filtering software.48
¶21 So far, no court has held a public library’s collection management constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment. The American Library Ass’n
Court acknowledged that this argument would not be consistent with precedent,

monographic series may in fact have a better record of evidence for a court to review, since these
decisions are less numerous than decisions about individual books. Law libraries tend to have more
subscriptions than book titles, and courts might be just as reluctant to review subscription decisions
because of the complexity of the factors that go into decisions to add, cancel, or withdraw.
44. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194, 241–42 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); Pico v. Bd. of Educ. (Pico II), 638 F.2d 404, 413–14 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff ’d, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
45. ALA II, 539 U.S. at 242 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (citing the plurality’s
conclusion in Pico III).
46. David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1637 (2006)
(proposing recognition as protected government speech based on relevance to the institutional mission and on positive impact on public discourse); Felix Wu, United States v. American Library Ass’n:
The Children’s Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional Roles, 19 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 555 (2004) (arguing that libraries’ discretion to filter the Internet is a form of speech activity
deserving of First Amendment protection). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps
Sharply to the Right, 12 Green Bag 2d 413 (2009) (arguing that the government speech doctrine
threatens protection of individuals’ First Amendment rights); Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government
Speech, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 365 (2009) (stating that the ALA II and Pico III decisions show the Court is
not willing to recognize library collections as government speech).
47. ALA II, 539 U.S. at 210–11.
48. The defendant library in Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District argued that its
“role as a public library carries with it the right and responsibility to make content-based judgments
about what to include in the collection.” Defendant’s Opening Brief at 28, Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l
Library Dist., 231 P.3d 166 (Wash. 2010).
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but the Court also specifically declined to rule on the question in that case.49 First
Amendment status for a library’s collection management authority could further
complicate questions of the relative authority among those involved in library collection challenges. If libraries were to have government speech rights, then so might
other government bodies that would regulate the library. As a result, conflicts
among patrons, libraries, and library regulators could frame all of the parties’
claims as First Amendment claims.
¶22 Other proposals would give libraries or librarians constitutional status as
trustworthy experts in balancing both First Amendment and library management
concerns.50 Under this theory, libraries or librarians would have some First
Amendment immunity from the challenges of library patrons and the regulatory
authority of other government bodies. While courts have allowed libraries special
accommodations under First Amendment law, courts have not granted libraries
authority as First Amendment institutions. Another theory of protection for academic law librarians or law libraries as collection managers is academic freedom,
but the constitutional status of academic freedom is largely unresolved.51
¶23 The survey of the library cases that follows demonstrates that courts have
not accepted any proposal that would give libraries absolute discretion in book
selection and Internet-access management. The boundaries of courts’ willingness
to defer to libraries are fuzzy, but even the deferential standard of the plurality in
American Library Ass’n suggests limits, and lower courts have continued to treat
libraries’ discretion as limited.

49. See ALA II, 539 U.S. at 210–11; but see id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] library’s exercise of judgment with respect to its collection is entitled to First Amendment protection.”); Ark. Educ.
Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (“When a public broadcaster exercises editorial
discretion in the selection and presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity.”).
50. Proposals for institutional deference or even autonomy generally advocate this recognition
for public libraries or offer guidelines that would encompass public libraries. See Lee C. Bollinger,
Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The New Frontier, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1103
(1995); Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988
Duke L.J. 685; Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1497 (2007); Frederick C. Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 115 (1998). Some proposals would extend protection to the decisions of librarians but not library boards. See Jim Chen, Mastering Eliot’s Paradox: Fostering Cultural
Memory in an Age of Illusion and Allusion, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1361, 1379 (2005); Robert M. O’Neil,
Libraries, Librarians and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 Hum. Rts. 295, 309 (1975); Rodney A. Smolla,
Freedom of Speech for Libraries and Librarians, 85 Law Libr. J. 71, 73 (1993); Mark G. Yudof, Library
Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 Ind. L.J. 527, 553–55
(1984).
51. See Bintliff & Danner, supra note 3; see also Gemma Devinney, Academic Librarians and
Academic Freedom in the United States: A History and Analysis, 37 Libri 24 (1986). Academic freedom
has not been afforded a clear status under the First Amendment. See J. Peter Byrne, Neo-orthodoxy in
Academic Freedom, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 143 (2009) (reviewing Matthew W. Finkin & Robert C. Post, For
the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom (2009) and Stanley Fish, Save the
World on Your Own Time (2008)).
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The U.S. Supreme Court Has Given Increasing Latitude to Libraries
Three Cases Demonstrate Variation in Facts and Analysis
¶24 The Supreme Court has ruled on three cases considering the application of
the First Amendment to libraries. Public community libraries were the subject of
two cases, and a public school library was the context for the third. These cases
provide thin guidance on how a library should manage its collection because none
produced majority opinions with clear rules of First Amendment application to
public libraries. In the first case, the majority applied a high level of scrutiny to
breach of peace convictions for a public library sit-in protesting the library’s policy
of segregation, but only four Justices found First Amendment freedoms had been
violated.52 In the second case, a majority agreed a trial was necessary to discover the
intent behind removal of books from school libraries, but only four Justices
asserted that intent to suppress ideas would offend the First Amendment.53 And in
the third case, the majority upheld federal library subsidies that are conditioned on
Internet filtering, but under three separate theories.54 Although these decisions lack
the clarity and authority of majority opinions, each contributes to an understanding of the current boundaries to libraries’ discretion to manage their collections.

Brown v. Louisiana
¶25 The first time the Supreme Court considered the applicability of the First
Amendment to a public library was in Brown v. Louisiana.55 Only four Justices
found the First Amendment applied, but a majority of the Court was unwilling to
defer to local authorities on whether library patron behavior was consistent with
the mission of the library. The case did not focus on the library’s collection,56 but
the holding and discussion has influenced the First Amendment law of public
library collection management.
¶26 Brown v. Louisiana was decided in 1966, more than a decade after the more
famous Brown decision that led to integration of public schools.57 In the library
case, the Supreme Court reviewed the convictions of five young African American
men under a state breach of peace statute for remaining quietly in a public library
for about fifteen minutes after they had been asked by the library staff to leave. The
small branch library in Clinton, Louisiana, was known locally to be a segregated
facility serving the white community. The five young men tested the segregation
policy through a planned visit that included a request for a book followed by a
quiet sit-in.58 Mr. Brown requested a book, and the library staff member identified
52. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion).
53. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico (Pico III), 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
54. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
55. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131.
56. Access to information was not directly at issue. The library staff member provided fairly
extensive service. The facts are unclear as to which book was sought, whether it was a title by Booker
T. Washington or by Arna Bontemps. A novel claim might have sought a right to access to “Negro
Literature,” which the whites-only Clinton branch was unlikely to have in its collection. See Karla F.C.
Hollaway, A Negro Library, in Bookmarks: Reading in Black and White: A Memoir 28 (2006).
57. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. Actually, only one of the men, Quincy Brown, was able to sit, because only one chair was
available for library patrons in the small branch library. The four other men stood beside Mr. Brown.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. at 135–36.
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a similar title in the central library and arranged to have it mailed to Mr. Brown. He
and his companions then remained quietly in the library and refused two requests
by library staff to leave. Having received advance notice of the sit-in from its organizer, the Congress of Racial Equality, the sheriff and some officers arrived ten to
fifteen minutes after the young men. When the men refused the sheriff ’s request to
leave, the sheriff arrested them. All of the young men were convicted under the state
breach of peace statute.59
¶27 The state breach of peace statute contained no avenue for appeal through
state courts, so the convictions were appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The
central disagreement on the Court was whether the actions of the library patrons
were consistent with use of the library for library purposes. A majority of the Court
declined to defer to the library staff or local law enforcement who maintained that
the young men had violated library norms by remaining in the library after receiving library service. Justice Fortas authored the prevailing opinion and expressed
regret that “a public library—a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to
beauty” should be the stage for confrontation, but concluded that no peace was
breached by the five men’s behavior.60 The opinion went further, finding that convictions violated the men’s rights to silent speech, assembly, and petitioning the
Government for redress under the First Amendment.61 Fortas conceded that a state
and its instrumentalities “may, of course, regulate the use of its libraries,” but added
that the regulations must be nondiscriminatory in policy and as applied when individuals are exercising constitutional rights.62
¶28 Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.63 Justice White concurred only
in the result, and based reversal of the convictions on the finding that “petitioners
were making only a normal and authorized use of this public library . . . .”64
¶29 The dissent, written by Justice Black, found the sit-ins were not consistent
with the purpose of public libraries and therefore could constitutionally be prohibited by state statute. The dissent said the Court’s holding meant states were “paralyzed with reference to control of their libraries for library purposes . . . .”65
¶30 The four Justices’ enforcement of First Amendment protections in Brown is
particularly striking given that local authorities had closed the library after the sitin.66 In the library collection cases that came later, courts generally accommodated
the library’s management requirements and relaxed First Amendment requirements through deference to local authorities.67 Underlying this accommodation is
implicit recognition that standard First Amendment enforcement of neutral treatment of speech and the press would be impossible for the library due to its need to
59. Id. at 137–38.
60. Id. at 142.
61. Id. at 141–42.
62. Id. at 143.
63. Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan preferred to overturn the convictions on
the basis of a prior Court holding that the Louisiana breach of peace law was overbroad. Id. at 146–47.
64. Id. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 165 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ.).
66. The library was still closed at the time of the Brown decision, almost two years after the sit-in.
See id. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
67. See infra ¶¶ 33–44 for a discussion of ALA II and Pico III.

355

356

Law Library Journal

Vol. 102:3 [2010-21]

manage scarce resources, and the library would have no alternative but to close.68
Even if somehow scarcity did not prevent the library’s compliance with standard
First Amendment requirements for neutral treatment of speech and the press, full
enforcement might be inconsistent with the library’s locally fashioned mission, and
the library would have to change its purpose or close because its purpose was frustrated by the First Amendment.69 So courts tend to adjust First Amendment standards for library collections to allow them to be selective, whether for reasons of
scarcity or design. In Brown the Court faced this ultimate irreconcilability of First
Amendment enforcement and the library’s purpose, at least as that purpose was
defined by local authorities. Rather than cope with additional sit-ins and presumably integration, the local authorities closed the library.70 The Court’s willingness
to enforce First Amendment protections even against this backdrop of the discontinuation of library service was no doubt strengthened, if not dominated, by the
force of interwoven equal protection concerns.71 If the library had not been the
target of the silent speech and petition activities, the Court may not have found the
exercise of those rights was consistent with the purpose of the library.72 Nonetheless,
Brown established precedent for judicial review of rules for library patron behavior,
and four Justices created persuasive authority for protection of First Amendment
freedoms of silent speech, assembly, and petition in the public library setting.
¶31 Even though Brown did not address application of the First Amendment to
the library’s decisions about its collection, the opinion has influenced lower court
cases about collection management. Brown v. Louisiana’s three-Justice prevailing
opinion is quoted in library cases for the characterization of a library as “a place
dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty.”73 As courts have developed doc68. See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681–82 (1998) (avoiding
application of standard First Amendment requirements because public broadcasters might choose—
and indeed the Nebraska Educational Television Network did so in the state’s 1996 U.S. Senate
race—to cancel an election debate rather than provide time for all ballot-qualified candidates to
participate).
69. The American Library Ass’n plurality opinion found that public libraries were selective in
their collections as a matter of design. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194,
204–09 (2003).
70. One library journal report questioned the given motivation, saying that the closing came
just a few weeks after the incident without any general public knowledge that plans for closing had
already been in progress. “This plan is supposed to save lots of money, but mostly (and of course
they don’t admit this) it keeps Negroes safely out of any buildings . . . .” Lockouts and Arrests—Repeat
Performance, Wilson Libr. Bull., Sept. 1964, at 22. The attorney for Louisiana explained in oral argument that the library was unable to find staff willing to keep the library open after the sit-in because
of fears that there would “be trouble.” Oral Argument, Brown v. Louisiana (No. 65-41), audio available
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_41.
71. Courts have accepted this trade-off in the equal protection context. Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that the closing of public swimming pools rather than integrating
them was facially racially neutral and therefore not in violation of the equal protection clause). But
see Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in
Equality Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513 (2004).
72. Mark Yudof suggested Brown may be “better understood as a race case than a First
Amendment one.” Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government
Expression in America 227 n.42 (1983).
73. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion). The Third Circuit cited
Brown as authority for finding a public library to be a limited public forum for the right to receive
information. See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 (3d Cir. 1992).
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trine to identify the types of First Amendment rights protected in public libraries,
the Brown decision has been authority for upholding patron behavior regulations
that require use of the library to be quiet and for recognition of the library’s role in
supporting access to speech but not in facilitating direct expression.74 Some of
these, in turn, have formed the basis for judicial review of libraries’ decisions to
restrict access to particular books or Internet content.75
¶32 Brown also serves as a reminder to libraries that when equal protection
issues are intertwined with First Amendment issues, courts may not extend as much
deference to the library. For example, if an academic law library specifically
excluded from its collection any materials on the history of slavery in the United
States or rejected all donations of resources on the law of women’s sports while collecting the law of men’s sports, the library might be called upon to defend its decision as a function of something other than an intention to suppress access to
certain ideas.
Board of Education v. Pico
¶33 The second Supreme Court opinion that addressed a public library and the
First Amendment was a challenge to school library book removal in Board of
Education v. Pico in 1982.76 The Pico Court was even more fractured than the Brown
Court. The case produced opinions in the district court, circuit court, and Supreme
Court. At the Supreme Court level, the decision included six separate opinions. The
Supreme Court majority agreed only to reverse the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the school system and remand for a trial for factual determinations. Four Justices from the majority also agreed on a standard for the trial court
to determine whether the motivation in removal of books from school libraries was
impermissible under the First Amendment. Despite the confusion of opinions and
lack of binding authority of any of them, Pico has had an impact on lower court
opinions involving both school77 and public library collections,78 and the local
actors treated the Court’s remand as a cue to restore the challenged books to library
shelves.
¶34 The case arose in response to the Island Trees school board’s decision to
remove particular books from the school system’s libraries. Members of the school
board identified several books in the Island Trees high school and junior high school
libraries as a “‘moral danger’” to students and “‘anti-American, anti-Christian, antiSem[i]tic, and just plain filthy . . . .’”79 The board appointed a committee of parents
74. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1261; see also Neinast v. Bd. of Trs., 346 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2003)
(stating that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to receive information” and citing Kreimer for
“the right to some level of access to a public library, the quintessential locus of the receipt of information”).
75. See Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530, 547 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Mainstream
Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Loudoun I), 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792 (E.D. Va. 1998).
76. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico (Pico III), 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
77. See ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1199–1200 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 659 (2009).
78. See Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1253; Sund, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 547; Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
79. Pico III, 457 U.S. at 857 (quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ. (Pico I), 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y.
1979)). The books at issue were Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.’s Slaughter House Five, Desmond Morris’s The
Naked Ape, Piri Thomas’s Down These Mean Streets, the Langston Hughes-edited Best Short Stories

357

358

Law Library Journal

Vol. 102:3 [2010-21]

and school staff to determine the books’ “‘educational suitability,’ ‘good taste,’ ‘relevance,’ and ‘appropriateness to age and grade level.’”80 The board rejected most of
the committee’s recommendations and returned only one book to the library without restriction and made one other available only with parental approval. Four high
school students and one junior high school student filed suit for violation of state
and federal free speech rights.
¶35 The district court ruled in favor of the school board’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that the board’s decision did not meet the school library context
standard of a “sharp and direct infringement of any first amendment right.”81 The
plaintiffs appealed, and the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s summary
judgment and remanded for full factual determination of the basis of the school
board’s decisions.
¶36 The Island Trees school board appealed, and a majority of the Supreme
Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s reversal of summary judgment and remand
for a trial. The three-Justice prevailing opinion declared that a school library collection required less judicial deference than the school curriculum. Quoting Brown
v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan equated the school library to the public library as “a
place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty.”82 In contrast with decisions
about which books to acquire, the removal of books was found to be both more
suspect as idea suppression and more easily reviewed for intent. The prevailing
opinion also traced the evolution of a right to receive information and found that
right could be at issue in the removal of school library books.
¶37 This limitation on the school libraries’ collection discretion was supported
by only four Justices, so no majority opinion in Pico set a standard for what is permissible or impermissible library book removal. Justice Blackmun concurred with
the three-Justice prevailing opinion that the trial court should find the school book
removal impermissible if the school board’s intention was to “‘prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’”83
Because motivation might be a mixed bag of reasons, the district court was to
determine whether denial of access to ideas was the “decisive factor,” which the
opinion further defined as a “substantial factor.”84 On the other hand, if the court
determined that the decisive factor for the board was that the books were “pervasively vulgar” or lacking in “educational suitability,” students challenging their
removal had conceded that the action would be constitutional.
¶38 Justice White concurred only in the judgment and explained that the issue
might be resolved on remand to the trial court without need to address issues of
constitutional law if the court found the motivation was one that the parties had
agreed was permissible.85
of Negro Writers, the anonymously authored Go Ask Alice, Oliver LaFarge’s Laughing Boy, Richard
Wright’s Black Boy, Alice Childress’s A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ but a Sandwich, and Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul
on Ice. Id. at 856 n.3.
80. Id. at 857.
81. Pico I, 474 F. Supp. at 397, rev’d, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff ’d, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
82. Pico III, 457 U.S. at 868 (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966)).
83. Id. at 872 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
84. Id. at 871 n.22 (plurality opinion).
85. See id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
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Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor each wrote dissenting
opinions. All of the dissenters would have extended broad judicial deference to
school boards in the management of school library collections in support of their
inculcative missions. Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[u]nlike university or public libraries, elementary and secondary school libraries are not designed for freewheeling
inquiry . . . .”86 But Justice Rehnquist’s dissent also indicates a widely shared agreement on the Court that school libraries do not have unlimited discretion in collection decisions. In response to Justice Brennan’s hypothetical examples of
impermissible removal of all books favoring Republicans or of all books supporting
racial equality, Justice Rehnquist wrote that he could “cheerfully concede” that the
First Amendment would not support such suppression of ideas.87
¶40 After the Supreme Court’s remand for trial, the Island Trees Board of
Education voted to return the books in question to the library shelves to avoid further litigation.88 The four-Justice Pico standard for review of book removal from a
school library is not binding authority, but it continues to serve as persuasive
authority to the lower courts.89 In addition, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent contributes
an important indicator that a strong majority of the Court agreed that libraries’
discretion was limited even in the school library context.
¶41 The key lesson from Pico for libraries may be that book removal could be
particularly suspect, and evidence of an intention to prevent access to an idea could
raise First Amendment questions. Although the Pico standard addresses only book
removal, a publicly funded library would be wise to avoid policies or practices that
suggest an intent to suppress access to an idea. If a state law library collected only
works by Republicans and not Democrats, even courts reluctant to review library
collection decisions would probably rule that the practice violates the First
Amendment. And if a county law library rejected books arguing against voting
rights for women, the library might be called upon to explain that the books
addressed legal issues beyond the scope of the limited resources and mission to
acquire materials related to current practice needs in the community. Similarly, if
an academic law library were to reject books about the influence of Christianity on
the nation’s founders or books with racist views, the library might need to articulate
reasons such as existing collection coverage of these arguments in order to avoid
challenges of intent to suppress the ideas. Although courts would probably only
review book removal decisions under the Pico plurality standard, the test can serve
as a reminder to librarians during the selection process as well, so that the librari¶39

86. Id. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, in American Library Ass’n, Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the plurality that public libraries have missions that require them to selectively provide
access to content. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003) (plurality
opinion).
87. Pico III, 457 U.S. at 907–08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I would save for another day—feeling quite confident that that day will not arrive—the extreme examples posed in Justice Brennan’s
opinion.”).
88. In a formal statement, the Board said it wanted to avoid a trial because that “would have the
effect of surrendering local control of the schools to the courts.” Shawn G. Kennedy, School Board on
L.I. Votes to Restore 9 Banned Books, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1982, at B1.
89. See ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1199–1200 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 659 (2009).
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an’s own distaste for an idea does not preclude the idea’s representation in the
collection.
United States v. American Library Ass’n
¶42 The third case in which the Supreme Court addressed the First Amendment’s
application in libraries is the 2003 decision United States v. American Library Ass’n,
where public library Internet filtering was at issue. Librarians may believe Internet
management is different from collection management, but a plurality of the
Supreme Court found that library Internet access is “‘no more than a technological
extension of the book stack.’”90 Thus, the holding in American Library Ass’n is an
important indicator of how much discretion law libraries have in both of these
areas.
¶43 Ironically, the Court’s recognition of libraries’ discretion in collection matters caused plaintiff libraries and library associations to lose their First Amendment
challenge to the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which they claimed
would induce libraries to violate the First Amendment rights of their patrons. The
CIPA statute conditioned federal discounts on Internet access in public and school
libraries on the installation of a “technology protection measure” to prevent access
by all persons to “visual depictions” that are “obscene” or “child pornography” and
to protect minors from access to “visual depictions” that are “harmful to minors.”91
The parties agreed that commercial filtering software overblocked and underblocked, and that even if technologically perfect, the statutory requirements for the
filters would restrict adult viewers to content suitable for children. The Act required
that filters be applied to all Internet access in libraries receiving federal funding and
provided permissive but not mandatory conditions under which library staff
might decide to disable the filters.92
¶44 Most law librarians have devoted little attention to the American Library
Ass’n decision because law libraries and university libraries do not qualify as potential recipients of the funding and discounts available through CIPA. However, the
decision has much to say about how law libraries might or might not be able to
limit patrons’ access to protected speech through the Internet or even how libraries
might be able to edit or excerpt material from their print collections. While most
law librarians—indeed most librarians—would not dream of hiding controversial
books or taking a razor to pages containing objectionable but legitimate content,
law librarians might consider Internet filtering in order to serve the same or similar
purposes as the CIPA statute.93
¶45 By the time of the American Library Ass’n case, First Amendment doctrine
had adopted public forum analysis to determine the level of judicial scrutiny for
different contexts. The American Library Ass’n district court used forum analysis to

90. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194, 207 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
91. Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B), (C) (2006); 20 U.S.C.
§ 9134(f)(1) (2006).
92. Id. §§ 254, 9134.
93. See Ruth A. Fraley, Internet Filtering in the Workplace, AALL Spectrum, Apr. 2001, at 10.
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determine that public libraries’ Internet access represented a dedicated public
forum and failed to meet strict standards for conformity with the First Amendment
principles of neutral treatment of speech and the press.
¶46 A provision in CIPA provided for appeal directly to the Supreme Court.94 A
five-Justice majority of the Court found that the high level of scrutiny was inappropriate for public library Internet filtering.95 Yet the Court could not muster a
majority opinion. The four-Justice plurality opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist,
held that public libraries require and merit broad discretion to make content-based
decisions in collection and Internet management because their very purpose is to
provide selective access to information.96 Because the CIPA Internet filter categories
were found to be content-based, CIPA did not induce libraries to go beyond their
allowed discretion under the First Amendment. The Court likened the public
library to two other institutions that had received similar deference: editorial discretion in public broadcasting as recognized in Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes97 and aesthetic assessments in awarding of national funding
for the arts as held in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley.98
¶47 The plurality opinion in American Library Ass’n does not discuss the limits
of libraries’ collection management discretion. The plurality only suggests that the
content-based Internet filtering was reasonable in light of the library’s purpose.99
But the multiple opinions reveal a widely shared assumption among the Justices
that if libraries did not disable the filters for patrons to gain access to protected
speech, that refusal could be unreasonable in light of the libraries’ mission.100 Justice
94. 20 U.S.C. § 7001 note (2006).
95. See ALA II, 539 U.S. at 204–09 (plurality opinion); id. at 215–17 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 204–09 (plurality opinion). Rather than drawing on his Pico dissent, in which he wrote
that public libraries were “designed for freewheeling inquiry,” Bd. of Educ. v. Pico (Pico III), 457 U.S.
853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.), Justice Rehnquist
wrote that the public library’s mission was to provide only “material of requisite and appropriate
quality for educational and informational purposes.” ALA II, 539 U.S. at 211.
97. Id. at 204 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–73 (1998)).
98. Id. at 205 (citing Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585–86 (1998)).
99. Despite the determination that forum analysis was inappropriate, the prevailing opinion
worked through and rejected both traditional and designated public forum status for public library
Internet access. This analysis would normally imply that the public library’s collection was a nonpublic forum, the default for government property rejected as traditional or designated public forums.
In a nonpublic forum, content-based decisions are held to a standard of reasonableness in light of
the purpose of the forum, but viewpoint-based decisions are still prohibited. The plurality equated
libraries with public broadcasters, which the Court held to be nonpublic forums, and with federal arts
awards, which the Court reviewed for viewpoint discrimination, a review consistent with nonpublic
forum standards. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680–82 (holding that a public television candidates’ debate was
a nonpublic forum in which viewpoint discrimination is forbidden and other content-based distinctions must be reasonable in light of the institutional purpose). See Finley, 524 U.S. at 580–81, 587
(finding decency criteria for arts awards to be merely advisory and so not viewpoint discrimination,
but suggesting that a calculated attempt to suppress certain ideas or viewpoints would be unconstitutional). See infra ¶ 60 for a discussion of Crosby v. S. Orange County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 172 Cal.
App. 4th 433, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting American Library Ass’n as finding libraries to be
nonpublic forums).
100. The three dissenters and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence emphasized the potential
unconstitutionality of permanent filters that block lawful speech. ALA II, 539 U.S. at 224 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 233 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 214–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 219 (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing unblocking as “an important exception” to CIPA
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Stevens would have given the policy of deference to libraries the weight of First
Amendment protection, which would have made the CIPA conditions unconstitutional violations of the libraries’ rights.101 Justice Souter’s dissent applied strict
scrutiny to the actions a library could take under CIPA and found it “would simply
be censorship.”102 In all, eight of the Justices found the ability of adult patrons to
gain access to protected Internet speech to be important to the constitutionality of
the library’s use of Internet software filters.
¶48 The impact of American Library Ass’n continues to be measured. Lower
courts continue to recognize some rights of access to information through public
libraries, but they no longer categorize public libraries as limited public forums or
apply strict scrutiny in library cases. Library literature is replete with conclusions
that the American Library Ass’n decision directs libraries to disable filters for access
to legal content upon request by adult patrons.103 On the other hand, some states,
counties, and municipalities have passed laws to require library Internet policies or
CIPA-like filtering of the Internet in public libraries within their jurisdictions.104
The first case to test American Library Ass’n’s implicit requirement to disable filters
for adults who request full access found that the Washington state constitution only
requires a public library to unblock access to web sites that meet the library’s mission, policy, and CIPA compliance.105 Nonetheless, many public libraries have
refused to apply for federal CIPA funding, citing both their refusal to filter the
Internet and the burdensome application process for CIPA funds.106 Law librarians
filtering requirements). Even the plurality implied that overblocking software might raise constitutional problems when Rehnquist wrote that “any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which
patrons may have the filtering software disabled.” Id. at 209 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.).
101. See id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967)).
102. Id. at 234–35 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
103. The American Library Association interpreted the decision to require libraries to disable filters or unblock particular sites for requesting adults. CIPA Decision Response: A Statement
from ALA President Carla D. Hayden and the ALA Executive Board 1–2 (July 25, 2003), available at http://0-www.ala.org.sapl.sat.lib.tx.us/Template.cfm?Section=archive&template=/content
management/contentdisplay.cfm&ContentID=39847; Mary Minow, Lawfully Surfing the Net:
Disabling Public Library Internet Filters to Avoid More Lawsuits in the United States, First Monday,
Apr. 5, 2004, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1132/1052.
104. See, e.g., Danielle Sottosanti, Oro Valley Council Gives Its Approval to Filtering of
Internet Porn at Library, Ariz. Daily Star, Feb. 15, 2007, at 9 (describing library Internet filters as  
subject to discretionary unblocking by librarians on library computers but not to be disabled for
library wireless Internet access); see also Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Internet Filtering
Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/telecommunicationsinformationtechnology/stateinternet
filteringlaws/tabid/13491/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 28, 2009) (providing a chart showing that a
minority of states have laws requiring public libraries to develop acceptable use policies).
105. Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., 231 P.3d 166 (Wash. 2010). This question
was certified to the Washington State Supreme Court from the federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington. Application of the state constitutional finding to the facts of the case was, at
the time of this writing, pending with the district court. The federal constitutional questions were
also pending with the district court. See Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., No. CV-06-0327-EFS,
2008 WL 4460018 (E.D. Wash. 2008).
106. In 2007, 43.8% of public libraries reported that they did not apply for federal E-Rate
discounts for Internet access. Thirty-eight percent cited the complicated process, 36% cited the low
value of the discount compared with time needed to participate, and 33.9% cited the need to comply

Vol. 102:3 [2010-21]

first amendment limits on library collection management

have not weighed in heavily on this subject, and most appear to continue to provide
unfiltered access to the Internet.107
¶49 Law libraries can look to American Library Ass’n for authority that Internet
filters designed to address problems of access to illegal content or even simply prioritize access to information in support of a collection policy are likely to be
upheld. The safest approach, though, may be to provide procedures for unblocking
particular web sites and disabling the filter upon request.
The Lower Courts Fill in the Gaps
Libraries as Limited Public Forums for the Right to Receive Information
¶50 After Pico and before American Library Ass’n, the lower courts developed a
line of opinions that increased the level of First Amendment scrutiny courts gave to
libraries’ decisions. These cases shaped recognition of libraries as limited public
forums for the right to receive information. Several cases reviewed regulations of
library patrons and found in favor of the libraries. In challenges to libraries’ decisions to restrict access to particular materials through a Braille program, the
Internet, or by relocation of books, courts held libraries had violated library users’
rights to receive information.
¶51 Playboy magazine was the subject of conflict in a District of Columbia federal district court case of American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin in 1986.108
Considering the case just a few years after Pico, the district court held that the
Library of Congress practice of providing Braille copies of popular magazines
through the Library’s Program for the Blind and Physically Handicapped constituted a nonpublic forum in which viewpoint discrimination was not permitted.
The case involved a challenge to the decision of the Librarian of Congress to discontinue the production of Braille copies of Playboy magazine after a Congressman
was successful in securing a funding decrease for the program equal to the cost of
providing the Braille copies of Playboy. The court found that the elimination of
Playboy from the program was because of its sexually oriented content and was
viewpoint discrimination, and the court directed the Librarian to reinstate the
Braille production and distribution of the magazine. The court said, “[a]lthough
individuals have no right to a government subsidy or benefit, once one is conferred,
as it is here through the allocation of funds for the program, the government cannot deny it on a basis that impinges on freedom of speech.”109 The district court
went to some effort to uncover the intent of the Librarian, including noting that he
had overruled his staff ’s recommendations. The district court did not cite the Pico
decision, but the focus on a factual determination of the basis for the removal of
the title from the program was similar to the analysis in the Pico school book
removal case.

with CIPA’s filtering requirements as reasons for not applying for the E-Rate discounts. John Carlo
Bertot, Charles R. McClure & Paul T. Jaeger, The Impacts of Free Public Internet Access on Public Library
Patrons and Communities, 78 Libr. Q. 285, 294 (2008).
107. See Fraley, supra note 93, at 10.
108. Am. Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1986).
109. Id. at 815.
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¶52 The Third Circuit was the first court to recognize public libraries as limited

public forums for the right to receive information. The court’s opinion in Kreimer
v. Bureau of Police,110 ten years after Pico, did not concern the content of the
library’s collection, but rather regulations on user behavior and hygiene. Richard
Kreimer, a homeless man who frequented the Morristown public library, challenged his ejection from the library for violating library policies that regulated user
behavior and hygiene. Kreimer argued that the library’s policies were impermissibly vague and overbroad and in violation of his First Amendment and due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.111
¶53 The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Mr.
Kreimer. The circuit court embraced “the positive right of public access to information and ideas” and determined that although the right to receive information
may be overcome by significant competing interests, it did include “the right to
some level of access to a public library, the quintessential locus of the receipt of
information.”112 The Kreimer court reviewed the Pico decision and distinguished
the inculcative role of school libraries from the role of public libraries and concluded that the Morristown library was a limited designated public forum dedicated “to aid in the acquisition of knowledge through reading, writing and quiet
contemplation.”113 The circuit court evaluated whether each challenged library
patron rule prohibited activities that were within or beyond the purpose of the
library as a limited public forum. Rules that prohibited behavior inconsistent with
the library’s purposes were upheld under a reasonableness standard. Personal
grooming requirements were subjected to strict scrutiny because library users subject to this restriction could be using the library for its intended purpose and yet
be in violation of the policy, but the court upheld these requirements as well.114
¶54 In 1998, a federal district court in Virginia cited Kreimer as the only case to
have examined whether a public library constituted a limited public forum. In two
connected decisions, the Virginia federal district court in Mainstream Loudoun v.
Board of Trustees considered the constitutionality of Internet filtering in the public
library.115 The Loudoun County library board of trustees had adopted a “Policy on
Internet Sexual Harassment” in order to install commercial Internet-filtering software and prevent access to child pornography, obscenity, and material considered
harmful to juveniles.116 A local nonprofit group and individuals from the county
sued for violation of their First Amendment rights to receive protected speech,
both because the software blocked beyond the library board’s categories and
because adults were restricted to content suitable for minors. Procedures for dis110. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
111. Id. at 1249.
112. Id. at 1255.
113. Id. at 1261.
114. See id. at 1262–64.
115. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Loudoun I), 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment); Mainstream Loudoun v.
Bd. of Trs. (Loudoun II), 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
116. The filtering also prevented access to e-mail and chat rooms, and all computers were
positioned to be in full view of library staff. These provisions, however, were not at issue in the
Mainstream Loudoun case. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
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abling were also challenged as burdens on First Amendment rights. The library
board argued that the library “could constitutionally prohibit access to speech simply because it was authored by African-Americans, or because it espoused a particular political viewpoint, for example pro-Republican.”117
¶55 The Mainstream Loudoun court found that the library board intended to
create county libraries “for the limited purposes of the expressive activities they
provide, including the receipt and communication of information through the
Internet.”118 The court determined that Internet access did not present the same
scarcity and inculcative mission factors that justified broad deference to secondary
school libraries in Pico.119 The court applied strict scrutiny to the content-based
restrictions of the Internet and found the policy failed because it did not serve a
government interest that was compelling, and also that it was not narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. The library did not produce empirical evidence to support its
argument that full access to the Internet created a hostile or harassing environment
for employees or library users, and the library had not employed a number of less
restrictive approaches to limiting unwanted access to harmful or illegal content.
The court also found that the Internet filter was a prior restraint on speech because
the policy provided inadequate standards and procedural safeguards to the library
staff to determine when and how to disable the filter.
¶56 Two years later, a federal district court in Texas cited language in Pico,
Kreimer, and even Brown v. Louisiana in holding that “[t]he right to receive information is vigorously enforced in the context of a public library . . . .”120 In Sund v.
City of Wichita Falls, the court reviewed community members’ challenge to a library
board resolution that allowed library card holders to petition for the relocation of
offensive books from the children’s section of the library to the section for adults.
Two books in the library’s children’s collection, Heather Has Two Mommies and
Daddy’s Roommate,121 had been the subject of much debate within the community.
The resolution specified that 300 signatures out of the community of 100,000 residents would trigger the relocation of a book within the library.122 The Sund court
held that the public library was a limited public forum for the right to receive information. The court applied strict scrutiny to the resolution and found that it burdened speech on the basis of both content and viewpoint. The court said that
evidence clearly showed the purpose of the resolution was to suppress access to the
two controversial books. The court held that the resolution did not serve a compelling government interest and was not narrowly tailored, and it entered a permanent
injunction against the library board resolution.
117. Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
118. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
119. This determination was made in the first opinion in the case, Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d
at 795.
120. Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530, 547 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
121. Id. at 532. Both books dealt with homosexual parents.
122. Id. at 534. The court made much of the interference of the board with the ability of the
library administrator to perform her duties “as a trained, skilled, and very competent professional.”
The court noted Ms. Hughes’s master’s degree in library science and her adherence to a code of ethics
that the court described as governing professional librarians. Id. at 541.
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¶57 The

Sixth Circuit in 2003 considered a First Amendment and due process
challenge to a public library’s one-day ejection of a patron for violation of a library
policy requiring the wearing of shoes.123 Neinast v. Board of Trustees was decided
three months after American Library Ass’n, but the Sixth Circuit did not cite the
Supreme Court opinion or make use of its rejection of forum analysis for public
libraries. The Sixth Circuit found the library was a limited public forum for the
right to receive information but upheld the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of the Columbus library. The circuit court found the library’s policy and
process did not directly burden the right to receive information and met the applicable standard for rationality.124 The court cited Kreimer for the conclusion that a
right to receive information included “‘the right to some level of access to a public
library, the quintessential locus of the receipt of information.’”125 The court then
cited Kreimer, Sund, and Mainstream Loudoun as support for its determination that
the library is a limited public forum for the right to receive information.126
Nonpublic Forums and Procedural Due Process
¶58 Since American Library Ass’n, lower courts have largely avoided use of the
limited public forum designation that formed the basis for the line of precedent
established by Kreimer, Loudoun, Sund, and Neinast. However, a First Amendment
right to receive information through a public library survived to form the basis for
First Amendment and due process challenges to patron regulations and Internet
use policies. The Pico standard for school library book removal also survived as
nonbinding but useful authority. One court considered American Library Ass’n
authority for application of nonpublic forum status to a community college
library’s Internet content policies, and another maintained Kreimer was authority
for limited public forum analysis for review of patron regulations.127
¶59 A right to receive information through public library Internet access was
entitled to procedural due process protection, according to a 2004 federal district
court in North Carolina. In Miller v. Northwest Region Library Board, the court said
the American Library Ass’n case made clear that public libraries are entitled to
restrict access to Internet sites containing visual obscenity or child pornography,
but that “American Library Association does not stand for the proposition that no
constitutional protections apply to Internet computers at public libraries.”128 The
North Carolina district court cited Kreimer and Neinast for the proposition that the
First Amendment includes the “‘positive right of public access to information and
ideas’” and “‘the right to some level of access to a public library . . . .’”129 Based on
these cases, the district court held that the plaintiff, who viewed Internet pornog123. Neinast v. Bd. of Trs., 346 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2003).
124. See id. at 591–92.
125. Id. at 591 (quoting Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F. 2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992)).
126. Id.
127. Crosby v. S. Orange County Cmty. College Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4th 433 (Cal. Ct. App
2009); Hill v. Derrick, No. 4:05-CV-1229, 2006 WL 1620226 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 8, 2006) (applying a reasonableness standard to library regulations prohibiting corporal punishment because rules did not
directly impact the patron’s right to receive information and upholding the regulations).
128. Miller v. Nw. Region Library Bd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569–70 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
129. Id. at 570 (quoting Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1255).
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raphy in violation of library policy, was entitled to due process before being banned
from the library system’s Internet computers. Because issues of fact remained unresolved, the Miller court also denied the plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment.
¶60 In 2009, in Crosby v. South Orange County Community College District, a
California district court applied a reasonableness standard of review to the community college library’s Internet use policy. The college’s policy restricted campus
Internet service, including in the college library, to “appropriate academic, professional and institutional purposes.”130 The policy also prohibited viewing or sending
of “obscene, indecent, profane, lewd, or lascivious material or other material which
explicitly or implicitly refers to sexual conduct . . . .”131 A college student challenged
the policies after a campus police officer asked him to stop viewing MySpace
images the officer said were pornographic. The district court found that the college
library was analogous to a public library and cited American Library Ass’n in determining that library Internet use was not a traditional or designated public forum.132
The court reviewed the library Internet use policies as a nonpublic forum, and
determined that they met standards for reasonableness and were not intended to
suppress a particular viewpoint.133
¶61 A challenge to a library’s refusal to disable Internet filters was filed in
Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District. The Washington Supreme
Court ruled that state constitutional protections for speech did not require the
library to disable the filter or unblock web sites for access to all constitutionally
protected speech. The court did find that the library would be required to unblock
access to sites inadvertently overblocked by the filtering software if the web site
content was consistent with the library’s mission, collection policy, and any applicable CIPA-compliance requirements.134 Using the standards for a nonpublic
forum, the court held that the state constitution would be upheld as long as the
library’s filtering policy “is reasonable when measured in light of the library’s mission and policies, and is viewpoint neutral.”135 The application of the facts to both
Washington State and federal law remain within the jurisdiction of the federal
district court, where the case was still pending at the time of this writing.
¶62 The four-Justice Pico standard for review of book removal in a school
library was accepted as persuasive authority in 2009 in the Eleventh Circuit
upholding of the removal of a book from the Miami-Dade County school libraries.136 Neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals found the American
Library Ass’n opinion relevant enough to merit distinguishing. ACLU v. MiamiDade County School Board involved a challenge to the school board’s withdrawal of
130. Crosby, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 436 (quoting the District Board’s policy).
131. Id. at 438 (quoting the District Board’s policy).
132. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194, 205–06
(2003)).
133. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
134. Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., 231 P.3d 166, ¶ 46 (Wash. 2010).
135. Id. at ¶ 65.
136. The Eleventh Circuit accepted the Pico standard only as nonbinding authority. “With
five different opinions and no part of any of them gathering five votes from among the nine justices—
only one of whom is still on the Court—Pico is a non-decision so far as precedent is concerned. It
establishes no standard.” ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1200 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 659 (2009).
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multiple copies of the children’s book Vamos a Cuba after some parents objected to
its portrayal of work and school life in Cuba as being like work and school in the
United States. A parent and two organizations challenged the removal under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court found that the decisive factor
in the removal of the book was the school board’s intention to prevent access to
ideas with which it disagreed and found that the board’s claim of inaccuracies was
a pretext for political orthodoxy. The Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing the facts de
novo, held that prevention of access to factual inaccuracies was the motivation for
the book’s removal and, under the Pico standard, that motivation was legitimate.
Even though members of the school board who were Cuban-American may have
had an interest in the book’s removal, the court of appeals found that their interest
did not impugn their motive.137
Status of First Amendment Protection for Libraries’ Collection Decisions
Nonpublic Forums Given Broad Discretion
¶63 The Supreme Court’s American Library Ass’n decision interrupted the lower

courts’ line of precedent applying high standards of scrutiny to libraries’ Internet
and collection management as limited public forums for the right to receive information. But some boundaries to libraries’ discretion are implicit in American
Library Ass’n and explicit in other library cases. One of the ambiguities of the
American Library Ass’n plurality opinion is whether the library’s collection represents a nonpublic forum or whether it is not a forum at all.138 If library collections
are nonpublic forums, courts would not allow content-based distinctions unless
they were reasonable in light of the library’s purpose. In addition, viewpoint distinctions would not be permitted. But, if library collections are simply not forums
at all, discretion might be limited only at the point that it becomes invidious viewpoint discrimination. The bottom line is, publicly funded law and other types of
libraries have either broad discretion to manage their collections or very broad
discretion to manage their collections.

137. Id. at 1227.
138. The plurality points to public broadcasters and federal arts awards as “two analogous
contexts” in which “the government has broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to the public.” United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA
II), 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–73
(1998); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)). In Forbes, the Court outlined
the usual public forum categories and included a fourth category for properties that are “not fora at
all.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677. Although the Forbes Court found the candidate debate at issue was a nonpublic forum, the Court suggested that most other television programming decisions would not be
held to even the low standards of the nonpublic forum because the editorial decisions of broadcasters
could not be expected to be viewpoint neutral. See id. at 679–82. In Finley, the Court found federal
arts awards based on excellence necessarily were content-based decisions and absolute neutrality
would not be possible. The Court characterized the awards criteria of excellence as content- but not
viewpoint-based and suggested that invidious viewpoint discrimination might present constitutional
problems. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585–87.
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Unreasonable Content-Based Distinctions Prohibited
¶64 The American Library Ass’n decision may be seen as holding public libraries
to the nonpublic forum standards that require content-based distinctions to be
reasonable in light of the library’s purpose. The Court’s widely shared concern that
libraries should unblock web sites to allow access to protected speech indicates that
libraries’ discretion has limits. One explanation would be that the library was held
to the low standards for nonpublic forums, which would require content restrictions to be reasonable in light of the library’s purpose.139 The district court in
Crosby interpreted the American Library Ass’n decision in this way when it upheld
a community college library’s Internet use policy as reasonable.140
¶65 This reasonableness standard might allow a library discretion to decide to
filter the Internet in an attempt to prioritize access to categories of content most
likely to support its collection development policy as a way to manage limited computer and bandwidth resources. Similarly, a court might uphold as reasonable a law
library’s removal of all computer manuals, older textbooks, and foreign law from a
jurisdiction no longer taught or studied by the faculty in order regain shelf space
for newer publications. But, if an academic law library were to remove all books on
the legal history of slavery or filter web sites about women’s health but not men’s, a
court might well find the decision to be a content-based distinction that was unreasonable in light of the library’s purpose and therefore in violation of speech and
press freedoms under the First Amendment. Particularly if the content restriction
raised equal protection questions of race or gender discrimination, a court might
take the approach of Brown v. Louisiana and determine that a library had exceeded
the boundaries of its First Amendment discretion. Law libraries are unlikely to
violate the law, though, as they develop collections to meet the needs of their
patrons.

Viewpoint Distinctions Versus Content Distinctions
¶66 If library collections and Internet access are nonpublic forums, courts
would also hold libraries to standards of viewpoint neutrality. Libraries would be
prohibited from making collection decisions based on the viewpoint expressed in a
book, journal, or Internet site.141
139. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992)
(outlining qualities of traditional and dedicated public forums and then characterizing the rest by
default as nonpublic forums). “Finally, there is all remaining public property. Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last category of property must survive only a much more limited
review. The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to
suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view.” Id.
140. See Crosby v. S. Orange County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4th 433 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009).
141. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(“Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum . . . the government violates the First
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an
otherwise includible subject.” (citations omitted)); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 48–49 (1983) (“[T]he school mail system is not a public forum . . . . [H]owever, the access
policy adopted by the . . . schools favors a particular viewpoint . . . and consequently must be strictly
scrutinized . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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¶67 The complexity of the collection management process and the malleability
of content and viewpoint categories, though, could make viewpoint neutrality
review difficult. Viewpoint distinctions may be just as unavoidable as content distinctions in a library’s collection management process.142 Because content and
viewpoint are not clearly differentiated, some distinctions that might be considered
viewpoint-based could receive more deferential treatment if a court defined those
distinctions as content-based. For example, graphic sexual content was at issue in
both American Library Ass’n and in American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin.143 In
American Library Ass’n, the Supreme Court treated graphic sexual images as content, which courts allowed libraries broad discretion to exclude.144 But in the
Boorstin case, the district court treated graphic sexual content as viewpoint, which
the court would not give the library discretion to exclude.145
¶68 Realistically, courts are unlikely to interfere with law libraries’ title-by-title
collection decisions, even when they turn on distinctions between viewpoints.
Courts do not like to review complex library collection decisions that balance a
multiplicity of factors such as quality of publisher, scholarly stature of the author,
relevance to local practice habits or curricular needs, cost, currentness, etc. But if a
law library were to collect only materials that advocated protection for school
prayer and excluded materials that argued against protection for school prayer, a
court could find the library’s practice offensive to the First Amendment using nonpublic forum standards prohibiting viewpoint distinctions.

Viewpoint Distinctions Versus Invidious Viewpoint Discrimination
¶69 Courts might hold libraries to an even more lenient standard that prohibits
only viewpoint distinctions that are “invidious discrimination” against the viewpoint. Eugene Volokh has suggested that quality-based selective subsidies of private
speech might be bound by this standard.146 With this more generous extension of
judicial deference, publicly funded libraries might be permitted to make distinctions based on viewpoint but could not discriminate against a viewpoint due to
hostility toward the view or toward those who hold the view.147
142. “[I]t is hardly clear that the line between viewpoint and other forms of content discrimination can be sustained, except possibly in extreme cases. Many subject matter restrictions (or
standards of quality) will mask or reflect viewpoint distinctions . . . .” Schauer, supra note 50, at 105
(1998). Schauer has suggested that librarians might appropriately make some viewpoint distinctions
and wrote that few would disagree “with the ability of a librarian to select books accepting that the
Holocaust happened to the exclusion of books denying its occurrence.” Id. at 106.
143. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2003); Am. Council
of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1986).
144. See ALA II, 539 U.S. at 208.
145. See Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. at 816.
146. Eugene Volokh, The First Amendment and Related Statutes: Problems, Cases and
Policy Arguments 411–12, 429 (3d ed. 2008). The Finley Court does not rest its holding on this
distinction but says, “[W]e have no occasion here to address an as-applied challenge . . . shown to be
the product of invidious viewpoint discrimination. If the NEA were to leverage its power to award
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would
confront a different case.” Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998).
147. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “invidious discrimination” as “[d]iscrimination that is
offensive or objectionable, esp. because it involves prejudice or stereotyping.” Black’s Law Dictionary
535 (9th ed. 2009). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “invidious” as “[e]ntailing odium or ill-will
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¶70 Justice Souter’s dissent in American Library Ass’n suggests that a majority of

the Court would agree that clear evidence of a library’s viewpoint discrimination
would offend the First Amendment. Justice Souter wrote that “in extreme cases” the
evidence will be available for judicial determination that a public library was
excluding material for “impermissible reasons (reasons even the plurality would
consider to be illegitimate), like excluding books because their authors are
Democrats or their critiques of organized Christianity are unsympathetic.”148
¶71 The Pico plurality’s standard for reviewing school library book removal is
similar. Intent to suppress access to ideas may be the same as invidious viewpoint
discrimination. The Pico plurality summarized: “[W]e hold that local school boards
may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the
ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’”149 Justice
Blackmun, in concurring, wrote “officials may not remove books for the purpose of
restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them,
when that action is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas
involved.”150 Blackmun noted widespread support for this limit on library discretion among the plurality and the dissent: “[A]s the plurality notes, it is difficult to
see how a school board, consistent with the First Amendment, could refuse for
political reasons to buy books written by Democrats or by Negroes, or books that
are ‘anti-American’ in the broadest sense of that term. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
appears ‘cheerfully [to] concede’ this point.”151 The Eleventh Circuit applied the
Pico standard in Miami-Dade but upheld the school book removal, finding that the
impermissible intent was not the sole motivation.152 Miami-Dade shows that this
low standard for impermissibility presents difficult evidentiary challenges. When
other criteria coexist with impermissible motivation, determination of what is pretext and what is motivation is elusive.153
¶72 The hypotheticals at the beginning of this article—a collection of
Democratic but not Republican authors, rejection of donated books arguing
against voting rights for women, filtering of web sites on women’s breast health, and
removal of racist publications—present a range of potential invidious viewpoint

upon the person performing, discharging, discussing, etc.” 8 Oxford English Dictionary 50 (2d ed.
1989). Martin Redish describes invidious viewpoint discrimination as that which targets the speaker
because of hostility toward the speaker’s “pre-existing ideological and political expressive associations.” Martin Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of
Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 67, 117 (2007).
148. ALA II, 539 U.S. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico (Pico III), 457
U.S. 853, 870–71 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
149. Pico III, 457 U.S. at 872 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
150. Id. at 879–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
151. Id. at 878.
152. ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1207 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 659 (2009).
153. Joelle C. Achtman, Note, Pico Takes a Visit to Cuba: Will Pretext Become Precedent in
the Eleventh Circuit?, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 943 (2009) (reviewing public school library book removal
challenges).
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discrimination practices. A successful justification for the first, the systematic
favoring of one major political party over another, would be difficult to imagine.
As discussed above, the rejection of donated books on a topic might be considered
either content or viewpoint distinctions and might be justified by current collection coverage, limited shelf space, or even irrelevance to a small county law library’s
collection plan. In most cases, a plaintiff would have a difficult burden to prove that
a library rejected the books solely with the intent to prevent access to the ideas
expressed. The filtering of web sites with the term “breast” might exclude a great
deal of women’s health information, but even a law library with the broader mission to support a law school might be able to justify the restriction on the basis of
specific health information not being relevant to the law school’s curricular priorities. The removal of materials because they express a racist perspective is by definition a removal based on suppression of access to the viewpoint, so a library might
have a difficult time defending the action if challenged.154 If the book was not
appropriate for other reasons, such as not supporting an updated collection development policy or not being a priority when shelf space is tight, the coexistence of
intent to suppress access to the idea could survive a Pico-type test. Despite the
invalidation of some campus hate speech codes as offensive to the First Amendment,
some campuses still have such codes, so law school libraries might encounter conflict between campus imperatives and the First Amendment.155
Procedural Due Process for Internet Acceptable-Use Policies
¶73 When libraries create Internet use policies that limit patrons’ access to ille-

gal or low-priority content in keeping with the library’s collection policy and mission, the American Library Ass’n decision makes clear that libraries are probably
within their discretion under the First Amendment. However, when patrons are
found in violation of the library’s policies, the Miller district court opinion stands
as an indication that the library may be held to some procedural due process
requirements, such as an appeals process, before the patron is denied access to
library resources.156 The Internet itself is a powerful tool and sometimes a unique
resource for legal information, so policies about use and enforcement of those policies are now integral to law libraries’ collection management.
First Amendment Rights of Libraries
¶74 The library plaintiffs in American Library Ass’n argued that their authority
to make collection decisions should have First Amendment speech status and
therefore be immune to the regulatory and even conditional funding efforts of
Congress. Justice Stevens, in dissent, embraced this argument and wrote that CIPA
offends the First Amendment because it impairs the ability of local libraries to truly
154. “The U.S. approach to regulation of racist speech is one of broad protection, with the
exception of situations in which such speech is coupled with violence.” Jeannine Bell, Restraining the
Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 Ind. L.J. 963 (2009); see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992).
155. See Bell, supra note 154, at 975 (citing Doe v. Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989) and UMW Post v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991)).
156. See Miller v. Nw. Region Library Bd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 563 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
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employ their own discretion and acts “as a blunt nationwide restraint on adult
access . . . .”157 The libraries’ claim was noted by the plurality as an argument that
ran counter to First Amendment precedent, yet the plurality specifically left the
issue open.158
¶75 Academic freedom could be recognized as a basis for academic law libraries’
First Amendment authority to manage collections without institutional or external
governmental interference. Currently, though, the law of academic freedom is
underdeveloped, and the application of any such protections to academic librarians
or other librarians is unclear.159
Conclusion
¶76 This survey of the First Amendment law of library collections shows that
law libraries and other publicly funded libraries have broad discretion to make collection decisions, including decisions about Internet access. Good collection management practices will tend to conform to First Amendment law, since librarians
are likely to make choices that are reasonable in light of their library’s purpose, and
because librarians generally uphold the library profession’s commitment to robust
discourse and noncensorship. Libraries should take care that policies on access to
information though the library’s Internet support the library’s mission, and if
restrictions are enforced, the library should follow procedures that allow patrons an
appeals process before library information resources are denied.
¶77 The First Amendment could provide some protection to librarians’ collection decisions, perhaps shielding them from authorities lacking librarians’ expertise
and commitment to ethical principles of robust access to information. Currently,
however, libraries and librarians do not have this type of First Amendment insulation. But the boundaries of libraries’ First Amendment discretion can protect
librarians’ efforts to provide access to information, even when that information is
controversial. If institutional interference or external forces threaten to limit the
collection in some way, librarians can take refuge not only in library professional
ethics and the logic of supporting libraries’ missions, but also in the boundaries of
discretion under the First Amendment. Fortunately, law library directors generally
report to judges, boards of local attorneys, or law school deans, many of them
experts in the First Amendment and generally protective of librarians’ role as collection managers. Even so, the test of robust access to information is tolerance for
unpopular views, so law librarians should be alert not only to the external threats
but also to their own inclinations to shape collections to reflect their own interests
157. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n (ALA II), 539 U.S. 194, 220 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the constitutional conditions doctrine’s recognition of a distinction between
inducement through restrictions on benefits and outright prohibitions).
158. See id. at 211 (plurality opinion).
159. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 Geo. L.J. 945 (2009); Neal H.
Hutchens, A Confused Concern of the First Amendment: The Uncertain Status of Constitutional
Protection for Individual Academic Freedom, 36 J.C. & U.L. 145 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Is There a
Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 907 (2006).
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or tolerances. Law librarians are the primary custodians of libraries’ broad First
Amendment discretion and should exercise that discretion with awareness that
collection management can support library institutional missions, librarians’ ethical principles, and a number of the important goals of the First Amendment.  

